









Faculty of Economics 
CAMBRIDGE WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS 
   












Prodigious amounts of data are being collected by internet companies about their users' preferences. 
We consider the information design problem of how to share this information with traditional 
companies which, in turn, compete on price by offering personalised discounts to customers. We 
provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which the internet company is able to perfectly 




CWPE  2105 
Published 14 January 2021 
Updated 11 March 2021 
 
 
Key Words Information design, market segmentation, price discrimination 
JEL Codes D43, D83, L13 
 
Website www.econ.cam.ac.uk/cwpe 
Market segmentation through information
Matthew Elliott, Andrea Galeotti and Andrew Koh*
December 5, 2020
Abstract
Prodigious amounts of data are being collected by internet companies about
their users’ preferences. We consider the information design problem of how to
share this information with traditional companies which, in turn, compete on price
by offering personalised discounts to customers. We provide a necessary and suf-
ficient condition under which the internet company is able to perfectly segment
and monopolize all such markets. This condition is surprisingly mild, and suggests
room for regulatory oversight.
1 Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed the emergence of a new internet based business
model where the value of the business is derived from the information it collects about its
users.1 The information collected by these internet companies is central to its offering—
it permits advertising to be precisely targeted by enticing users to click through with
special, personalized offers.
The extraordinary profitability of this business model has raised new antitrust concerns.
Such concerns have thus far centred largely on the dominance of these internet com-
panies qua internet companies e.g. the dominance of Google in the market for digital
advertising.2 By contrast, considerably less attention has been paid to the attendant
effects on competition in traditional markets. Can the owner of information provide it
in a way which creates rents by reducing competition to the detriment of consumers?
Is this something that could realistically happen—and might be happening—across very
many markets, or are the requisite conditions sufficiently demanding such as to remain
beyond practical concern? Might the ability of such internet companies to create such
rents explain their (colossal) valuations?3
We make progress on this problem under the assumption that the internet company’s
profits are increasing in the firm surplus obtained in traditional markets. This abstracts
*Elliott: Cambridge University, email mle30@cam.ac.uk; Galeotti: London Business School; Koh:
Oxford University. First version: August 2019. We wish to thank Nageeb Ali, Ben Golub, Konstantin
Guryev, Navin Kartik, Stephen Morris and Ludovic Renou. Jörg Kalbfuss provided excellent research
assistance. Elliott acknowledges funding from the European Research Council under the grant EMBED
#757229. Galeotti acknowledges funding from the European Research Council under the grant #724356.
1The revenues of these businesses are primarily sourced from traditional companies who pay for access
to users (via advertisements) rather than users themselves, who typically enjoy free access to the internet
company’s services e.g. a platform to connect with friends.
2For instance, the US Justice Department is preparing to bring an antitrust lawsuit against Google
over alleged anticompetitive practices in its advertising business.
3Britain’s Competition and Markets Authority found that the cost of digital advertising for firms was
worth £500 ($640) per household per year. While some of these costs are no doubt driven by the market
concentration among internet companies, we explore a distinct but complementary force.
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from strategic interactions between the internet company and traditional firms, and
centres our analysis on the following information design problem: an information de-
signer has perfect information about consumer preferences for differentiated products,
and chooses what information to pass along to firms. After firms receive information,
they compete by setting prices.
Theorem 1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition under which the information
designer can induce perfect segmentation and monopolization of traditional markets.
This condition is relatively mild, and when it is not fulfilled, we show that an intuitive
alternate design can still extract significantly more surplus than the setting in which firms
have no additional information about consumer preferences. Furthermore, the proof is
constructive and it illustrates how such an information structure can be designed.
1.1 Example. We illustrate the main insights with a simple example. Consider the
canonical model of horizontal differentiation in Hotelling (1929). Two competing firms,
1 and 2, are located, respectively, at the extreme points of the interval [0, 1]. A mass
1 − 2η of consumers is uniformly distributed on the interval. These are non-captive
consumers who have unit demand and consumption value for either product normalised
to 1. Horizontal differentiation is captured by linear transportation cost t so a consumer
located at x pays transportation costs tx to purchase from firm 1 and t(1−x) to purchase
from firm 2. In addition, a mass of consumers η ∈ [0, 1/2] are captive for each firm. These
consumers have inelastic unit demand and a consumption value of 1 for the product of
the firm they are captive to, and no consumption value for the product of the other firm.
Ex-ante, firms do not know the location of any particular consumer. But there exists an
information designer who possesses this information. Can the information designer reveal
information to the firms about the customers’ preferences so that, in the ensuing pricing
game (i) the equilibrium is efficient; and (ii) firms extract all the available surplus?
Simple Information Design. Consider the following information structure where firm
1 (2 resp.) receives precise information about the preferences of all non-captive consumers
in [0, 1/2] ([1/2, 1] resp.), but receives no information for all other consumers (including
their captive customers).
After receiving this information, both firms play a price setting game.4 Given this in-
formation structure, consider the strategy where firm 1 (2 resp.) offers a personalised
discount to customers located in [0, 1/2] ([1/2, 1] resp.) which just covers their trans-
portation costs, and no discounts to all other customers (thus charging them a price
of 1). Under this strategy profile, the market is perfectly segmented and monopolized:
firms sell to their captive consumers at list price 1 and, at the same time, extract all the
available surplus from the non-captive consumers located closer to them than the other
firm.
When is this strategy profile an equilibrium? Consider, without loss of generality, firm
1. A crucial observation is that from firm 1’s point of view, it is unable to distinguish
consumers in the interval [1/2, 1]—those which are closer to firm 2—and its own captive
consumers. This profile is an equilibrium when it prefers to charge price 1 to this bundle
4We can think of firms as setting a uniform list price of 1 equal to valuations, and offering targeted
discounts. Since it is dominated for firms to set any price greater than 1, this is without loss.
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rather than offering a discount which would steal some consumers in the interval [1/2, 1]
at the cost of charging each consumer a lower price. As firm 2 extracts all surplus from
consumers in the interval [1/2, 1] by charging a price equal to their respective valuations,
if firm 1 deviated and charged these consumers a price p, a consumer located at (1−p)/t
would be indifferent between buying from firm 1 and firm 2. Hence firm 1 does not have
a profitable deviation to charge a price p instead of the price 1 if and only if
η ≥ p
(








When this obtains for all p ∈ [0, 1/2], firm 1 will charge consumers in the interval [1/2, 1]
a price of 1, hence allowing firm 2 to extract the full surplus from such consumers. For
every t > 0, there exists a threshold η̄S(t) < 1/2 such that if the fraction of captive
consumers is above this threshold, the above strategy profile is an equilibrium; Figure 1
plots this function, and the formal analysis is provided in Supplementary Appendix II.
A natural benchmark to consider is t = 1 i.e. both firms have gains from trade with
every consumer in the interval [0, 1]. For this case, it is sufficient for each firm to have
just 7.5% of the total mass of consumers captive.
Figure 1: The minimum mass of captive customers required for the simple information
design described to induce perfect segmentation and monpolization of the market.
The information structure that we have proposed exhibits the following properties. First,
it gives detailed and exclusive information to each firm about the subset of consumers
the firm should sell to in an efficient allocation. Second, it matches a firms’ captive
customers to all consumers the firm is tempted, but for whom it is inefficient for it to sell
to. Third, firms extract all consumer surplus from all its sales. As such, the information
designer in effect recreates the standard differentiated product market monopoly problem
by bundling consumers together: firms choose between extracting more surplus from high
value consumers by excluding low value consumers (‘intensive margin’), or extracting
less surplus from more consumers by setting a lower price (‘extensive margin’). The
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information designer sets up this problem so that the optimal choice for both firms is to
exclude the low value customers, leading the market to be segmented.
1.2 The role of captive consumers. Our simple information design works in some,
but not the widest possible range of settings e.g. for lowest possible mass of captive con-
sumers, or lowest possible transportation costs. To see why, observe that the information
design we considered only made use of captive consumers to hold down each firm’s incen-
tives to price more aggressively to the segment of consumers captured by its competitor.
Our general characterization in Theorem 1 shows that information structures that are
most generally able to attain efficiency and full extraction also utilize non-captive con-
sumers to the same effect, though they share the key features documented above. Indeed,
Theorem 1 shows that we do not need any captive consumers for efficiency and full surplus
extraction, although the presence of captive consumers is helpful.5
1.3 Related Literature. While there is a rich literature on price discrimination from
Pigou (1920), our paper contributes to a more recent strand studying how the informa-
tional environment interacts with consumer and firm surplus. Bergemann et al. (2015)
studies price discrimination when a monopolist obtains additional information about
consumer valuations and show that every combination of consumer and producer surplus
in the ‘surplus triangle’ can be obtained by some segmentation. By contrast, we work
in a n-firm setting in which firms obtain (generically different) additional information
about valuations and compete for customers.6 Introducing competition richens the set-
ting,7 but also makes the problem more demanding than the monopoly case by requiring
consideration of an induced pricing game among firms.8
In a similar vein, Ali et al. (2020) consider a disclosure game in which a consumer
chooses some verifiable information about her preferences to convey to competing firms.
They show access to ‘rich messages’—the ability to reveal only partial information—
can in effect play firms against each other and intensify competition, thereby increasing
consumer surplus. By contrast, we study the conditions under which suitably designed
5Captive consumers will also serve as a convenient benchmark in Section 4 to study how the conditions
for perfect segmentation and monopolization vary with transportation costs, as well as compare the
relative performance of different information structures.
6There is large literature on information sharing among oligopolists asking to what extent competing
firms with partial information might share information via an intermediary (see, e.g. Novshek and Son-
nenschein (1982), Vives (1988), Raith (1996)). Our setting differs considerably because (i) we explicitly
model an information designer who chooses how information is partitioned among firms—by contrast,
the intermediary in their setting simply facilitates the dissemination of information firms themselves
choose to share; and (ii) we consider more granular information at the level of individual valuations
rather than, say, about a stochastic demand function.
7The very same markets in which we might expect feasible personalized pricing e.g. online retailers
are also those with low consumer search costs—and hence high degrees of competition.
8Armstrong and Vickers (2019) consider the effect on consumer welfare when sellers are able to
discriminate against their respective captive consumers. They assume all firms observe a common signal
about whether, and to which seller a consumer is captive to. By contrast, we emphasise the possibility—
and limits—of information design in more general type spaces by allowing the designer to send firms
generically different signals. Although we use captive consumers in the example to illustrate key forces,
they are in general non-essential to our main result. See also Albrecht (2019) who considers a Bertrand
duopoly setting.
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information structures can weaken competition, thereby increasing firm surplus. Further,
we take consumer valuations as known to the information designer rather than disclosed
strategically.9
While we focus on a setting in which firms are uncertain about consumer valuations,
Roesler and Szentes (2017) study the converse problem in which consumers rather than
firms have uncertain valuation. For the monopoly case, they characterise the signal
structure which is best for consumers. Armstrong and Zhou (2019) extend this setting
to the duopoly case, and characterise both firm-optimal and consumer-optimal signal
structures.
More generally, our paper relates to a wider literature in information design. Bergemann
and Morris (2013, 2016) consider general many-player settings and examine how the in-
formational environment maps to resultant equilibria.10 In the special case with a single
receiver, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show that ‘concavification’ of the designer’s
payoff as a function of receiver’s posteriors generally binds the designer’s maximum at-
tainable utility and characterises the optimal signal structure. However, there are well-
known difficulties applying such arguments to infinite-dimensional settings characteristic
of differentiated products. We make progress by showing that it can be helpful to reframe
a seemingly intractable information design problem as a matching problem, and believe
this approach might be fruitfully applied in other contexts.
Our paper also relates to a burgeoning literature on markets for information broadly
conceived—the transaction, pricing, and design of information (see, e.g., Admati and
Pfleiderer (1986), Lizzeri (1999), Taylor (2004) Calzolari and Pavan (2006), Bergemann
and Bonatti (2015), Bergemann et al. (2018), Acemoglu et al. (2019), Bergemann et al.
(2019), Fainmesser and Galeotti (2019), Montes et al. (2019), Jones and Tonetti (2020),
Bounie et al. (2020); also see Bergemann and Bonatti (2019) for a summary). Perhaps the
closest paper to ours is Bounie et al. (2018). Like us, they consider a data intermediary
choosing what information to reveal to firms about consumer valuations. A major focus in
their paper is when the intermediary will sell information to a single firm or both. They
conduct their analysis within a Hotelling model with linear transportation costs and,
most importantly, restrict the set of possible information structures that the data broker
can offer firms. By contrast, our objective is to understand the conditions under which
a data intermediary can induce perfect market segmentation in the downstream market.
To this end, we abstract away from the way industry profits are shared between firms and
the intermediary. Instead, we centre our focus on providing a tight characterization of
our information design problem in a general oligopoly model with differentiated products
and arbitrary information structures. In particular, the information structure that we
construct to determine the necessary and sufficient condition for perfect downstream
segmentation pools together high value consumers of a given firm it is efficient for the
9This is in line with the key observation made in Acemoglu et al. (2019) that a consumer’s data can
be used to draw inferences about other consumers, which in turn pushes down consumers’ incentives to
protect their personal data. Nonetheless, it will be evident that whenever a firm-optimal equilibrium is
possible, all firms find it optimal to set a list price equal to the highest possible valuation so personalized
pricing is conducted via personalized discounts. As such, insofar as disclosure is verifiable, consumers
have incentive to report their valuations to enjoy lower prices e.g. by enabling their cookies.
10In the language of Bergemann and Morris (2013, 2016), our problem can be restated as finding
necessary and sufficient conditions for a Bayes Correlated Equilibria which fulfils efficiency and full
surplus extraction.
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firm to sell to with lower value consumers it is inefficient for the firm to sell to. This
information structure requires pooling consumers over disjoint intervals of the valuation
space and so is ruled out by the exogenous restriction of Bounie et al. (2018) and it is,
to the best of our knowledge, novel in the literature.
2 Model
2.1 Setup. There is finite set of firms, indexed N = {1, . . . , n} each of which produces
a single product. There is a unit mass of consumers distributed on Θ = [0, 1]n. Each
consumer demands a single unit inelastically and type θ := (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ Θ obtains value
θi ∈ [0, 1] from purchasing from firm i. To keep track of which consumers value which
product most highly, we partition the type space Θ into n regions, E1, . . . , En, where
Ei := {θ ∈ Θ : max(θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) = θi} are the types of consumers who value firm
i’s good most. Although we focus on the interpretation with a continuum of consumers
throughout this paper, all results can be translated into an alternate setting with a single
consumer of uncertain type.
Firms choose prices from a discrete price grid with k increments between the minimal
product valuation of 0 and maximum valuation of 1. The discrete price grid serves two
purposes. It simplifies the exposition by eliminating the need to compare zero measure
sets, and removes concerns that results we would obtain in a continuous version of the
model do not correspond to the limit of a discrete model. For completeness, we solve the
continuous version of the model in Appendix B and show that an exact analogue of our
main result continues to hold.
Let Vk = {0, δ, . . . , (k − 1)δ, kδ = 1} denote the available prices. Assuming it is not
possible to make consumers commit to paying a random price, we restrict our attention
to the coarsening of consumer valuations for a given product i to vi(θi) := max{vi ∈ Vk :
vi ≤ θi} which is the highest price a consumer of type θ is willing to pay for firm i’s
product. Denote v(θ) := (v1(θ1), . . . vn(θn)) which we call the consumer’s effective type.
Finally, let f(v(θ)) : V nk → [0, 1] denote the mass of consumers with valuations in the
space [v1, v1 + δ) × [v2, v2 + δ) × . . . × [vn, vn + δ) ⊆ Θ.11 When it is unlikely to cause
confusion, we will often abuse notation and use v(θ) ∈ Θ′ to denote {v(θ) : θ ∈ Θ′}
where Θ′ ⊆ Θ. Finally, to simplify the exposition, we assume consumers are distributed
atomlessly with full support over Θ which also implies f has full support over V nk .
12 We
have thus coarsened the type space Θ to the effective type space V nk where there is a
positive mass of consumers for each effective type.
An information designer—an internet company, say—chooses how to distribute informa-
tion about consumer preferences across firms. We make the following assumption on the
designer’s payoff.
Assumption 1. The information designer’s payoff is increasing in total firm surplus.
For each firm, the information designer commits in advance to a signal structure it will
provide about each type of consumer. For each firm i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the information
designer chooses a message function
ψi : Θ→ ∆(M)
11With the exception of vi = 1, in which case we simply consider the point {1} on the ith product.
12This is in general not necessary.
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where M ⊇ Vk is the message space and ∆(M) is the set of feasible probability distribu-
tions over M . Call m ∈ M a message realisation. Denote the set of all sets of message
functions with Ψ where ψ := (ψi)
n
i=1 is a typical member. The information designer
learns the exact valuation of each consumer for each product,13 and releases messages to
each firm i ∈ {1, . . . , n} in accordance with the message function. Given the messages
received for each consumer, firms then play a pricing game: a pricing function for firm
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is pi : M → Vk. Let Pi be the space of possible pricing functions for firm
i. A strategy for firm i is σi : M → ∆(Pi).
Our goal is to characterize conditions under which the information designer is able to
choose message functions such that, in the resultant subgame, each consumer of type
θ ∈ Θ:
C1 (Efficient allocation) buys from firm i if and only if θ ∈ Ei;14 and
C2 (Full Surplus Extraction) pays maxv(θ).
Note that in practice, internet firms can either provide information to supplement firms’
existing access to consumers, or provide both information and access to consumers.15
We focus on the former case in which firms can make personalized offers to consumers
without depending on the information designer e.g. through discount codes via customer
mailing lists. This can be interpreted as the worst case for the information designer.
In Proposition 2, we consider the possibility that the information designer obtains the
ability to segment access in addition to designing information and show that this weakens
the conditions under which an equilibrium fulfilling conditions C1 and C2 can be induced.
Let Γ∗ denote the set of induced games in which there exists an equilibrium satisfying
conditions C1 and C2, and let
Ψ∗ := {ψ : Γ(ψ) ∈ Γ∗}
be the set of message functions that the information designer can use to fulfil both
conditions. We now turn our attention towards characterising exact conditions under
which an information designer is able to achieve conditions C1 and C2 i.e. Ψ∗ 6= ∅.
When Ψ∗ 6= ∅ we say that the information designer can perfectly segment the market.
3 Characterisation
In order to satisfy conditions C1 and C2 we have to sell all consumers their most preferred
product and charge each consumer the highest possible price they would be willing to
pay for this product. Thus each firm i must learn the effective valuation v̄i for each
consumer of type Ei. Hence we can, without loss of generality, fix the message received
for such consumers with v̄i. This yields the natural interpretation of messages as price
recommendations.
13Note that it does not matter whether the information designer learns about each consumer’s type
before or after committing the message functions.
14Note that we we can exclude consumers of types θ ∈ Ei ∩ Ej for any i 6= j since this is a zero
measure set
15See Bergemann and Bonatti (2019) for a discussion of this distinction.
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If firm i simply receives information about the valuations of consumers in Ei, it can do
better by additionally capturing consumers it is not meant to sell to under conditions C1
(those of types Θ \Ei). This is because conditions C1 and C2 imply such consumers are
being charged prices equal to their maximum effective valuation, the maximum surplus
for such a consumer is δ. As such, firm i can generically offer such consumers discounts
to undercut their competitor, thereby violating condition C2. In order to prevent firms
from making such sales, we need to assign consumers of types Θ \Ei (those firm i should
not sell to) messages also shared by consumers of types Ei (those firm i should sell to).
We do so with the following matching function:16
gi(v
′(θ′)|v̄i) := ψi(m = v̄i|v′(θ′))f(v′(θ′)),
which denotes the mass of consumers of effective type v′(θ′) ∈ Θ \Ei which are matched
to types {vi(θi) = v̄i : θ ∈ Ei}—and hence for whom firm i receives message v̄i.
A first observation is that if v′i > v̄i, then g(v
′|v̄i) = 0 because after receiving message
v̄i, condition C2 requires that firm i sets price v̄i. But given that the pricing of other
firms satisfies condition C2, consumers of type v′(θ) ∈ Θ \Ei are only obtaining surplus
between [0, δ), and would prefer to buy from firm i to obtain surplus greater than δ
thereby violating condition C1. We thus restrict our attention to matching functions
which fulfil this condition.
Next, we need to ensure that the matching functions do not incentivize any firm i to
deviate and charge a price strictly lower that vi to capture some of the extra consumers
after receiving a given message realisation. Conditions C1 and C2 require that for all
firms i, this needs to hold for all possible messages v̄i ∈ Vk and all possible deviations
given a message v̄i to some price v̂i < v̄i.
However, as an artefact of our discretization, the case where v′i = v̄i requires some care.
Consider a consumer of effective type in {v′(θ′) ∈ Ej : v′i = v̄i}. By condition C2, they
must be receiving surplus sj ∈ [0, δ) from buying from firm j 6= i. However, since v′i = v̄i,
they also receive positive surplus si ∈ [0, δ) from buying from firm i. Whether si > sj
or sj ≥ si will depend on the consumer’s exact valuation given by their underlying type
on the continuous space Θ. We will approach the problem by first supposing all such
consumers have valuations si > sj, and hence buy from firm i. This maximally restricts
the matching which will be possible without violating incentive compatibility. We then
suppose all such consumers have valuations si < sj, and hence buy from firm j 6= i. This
will introduce some slack into our incentive compatibility constraints.
First we write down the tighter incentive compatibility constraints which can be viewed















Profits from charging v̂i < v̄i
(IC)








is an upper bound on the additional mass of consumers obtained by deviating to setting
price v̂i ≤ v̄i.
Next we write down the looser incentive compatibility constraint which can be viewed as























is a lower bound on the additional mass of consumers obtained by deviating to setting
price v̂i ≤ v̄i.
Finally, the total mass of consumers matched to some message vi must be consistent
with the actual distribution of consumers. Formally, for all firms i and all effective types
v′ ∈ {v′ ∈ Θ \ Ei : v′i > 0}, ∑
v̄i∈Vk
g(v′|v̄i) = f(v′). (Consistency)
To see this, note that if
∑
vi
g(v′|vi) < f(v′), firm i can in effect infer the effective types
of some consumers of type v′ ∈ Θ \ Ei because these consumers have not been garbled
together with consumers of effective types Ei. There then exists some price deviation
firm i can offer to capture these consumers, thereby violating conditions C1 and C2.
These observations on what message functions must look like to induce an equilibrium
fulfilling C1 and C2 are formalised in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.
(i) The information designer can perfectly segment the market if there exist messages
ψ ∈ Ψ such that for all firms i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, IC and Consistency are fulfilled.
(ii) The information designer cannot perfectly segment the market if there does not
exist messages ψ ∈ Ψ such that for all firms i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, IC and Consistency
are fulfilled.
The proof of Lemma 1 is deferred to Appendix A. It proceeds by arguing IC and
Consistency are by construction sufficient to induce an equilibrium in the subsequent
subgame fulfilling conditions C1 and C2. By IC, every firm finds it optimal to obey
the pricing recommendation given by each of its message realisations. Further, Consis-
tency ensures that in the process of setting these prices to extract the full surplus from
9
consumers in Ei, firm i has, in the process, also set prices v̄i > v
′
i for nearly all types
v′ ∈ Θ \ Ei.17 But for such prices, consumers of type v′ ∈ Ej, j 6= i obtain strictly
negative profits from purchasing from firm i, and so can do no better than purchasing
from firm j at price vj. In this regard, the matching function gi has successfully garbled
all consumers of types Θ \ Ei together with those in Ei, but in an incentive compatible
manner. Further, both IC and Consistency are necessary. IC imposes a lower bound
on firm i’s additional surplus from deviating to a lower price. If this is violated, then firm
i has a profitable deviation for some positive mass of consumers. Consistency requires
that the matching function gi successfully garbles types Θ\Ei together with those in Ei.
If this is not fulfilled, then this implies some positive mass of consumers of types Θ \ Ei
are assigned messages from the set M \ Vk. But if so, firm i can infer the identities of
these consumers, and will find it profitable to undercut its competitors.
Lemma 1 pins down what, if exists, first-best message functions should look like. We now
turn to the question of whether such message functions can be constructed. Define the









f(v′) if v̄i > v̂i
0 otherwise.





which is the total mass of consumers with valuations greater than or equal to v̂i which
have also been matched to consumers of types Ei. We are now ready to state our main
result.
Theorem 1.
(i) The information designer can perfectly segment the market if for all firms i ∈
{1, . . . , n} and all consumer valuations v̂i ∈ Vk





(ii) The information designer cannot perfectly segment the market if there exists a firm






17Except for types which have zero valuation for firm i’s product.
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(iii) In the limit as the price grid becomes fine, the sufficient condition from part (i)
and necessary condition from part (ii) for perfect market segmentation coincide
lim
k→∞
H∗i (v̂i + δ; k) = lim
δ→0
H∗i (v̂i + δ) = H
∗
i (v̂i).
Theorem 1 offers sufficient and necessary conditions for there to exist message functions
which can induce an equilibrium fulfilling C1 and C2 in the resultant subgame. Part (i)
states that if the translated function H∗i (v̂i+ δ) is first-order stochastically dominated by
the actual distribution of consumers f , this is sufficient for there to exist such message
functions. The translation by δ corresponds to the ‘slack’ obtained from assuming that
all indifference in effective valuations between i and j for a type in Ej is broken in favour
of firm i. Part (ii) offers a partial converse, and states that if H∗i (v̂i) is not first-order
stochastically dominated by the actual distribution of consumers f , there does not exist
any such message function. Condition (iii) states that these two conditions are identical
as we make the price grid arbitrarily fine i.e. δ → 0.
Before we prove this, Figure 2 below illustrates the key underlying ideas. We show the
limit case as the price grid becomes fine for simplicity of exposition. In both panels, the
blue line labelled h∗i (v̂i) represents the total mass of consumers of effective types v ∈ Θ\Ei
assigned message v̂i ∈ Vk (viewed from the ith axis).18 The red lines represents the actual
mass of consumers of effective types Θ \ Ei with valuations v̂i for firm i’s product.
Panel (a) illustrates how a distribution fulfilling the conditions in Lemma 1 can be con-
structed when the condition in Theorem 1 is fulfilled. Note that for every vai ∈ Vk, the
mass of consumers in Ω \ Ei assigned some message greater than vai exceeds the total
mass actual consumers with valuations of at least vai for firm i’s product. As such, the
designer can perform ‘leftward’ shifts of the mass of consumers matched to Ei to satisfy
the condition that the mass of matched consumers must be consistent with the actual
distribution. Doing so simultaneously ensures all incentive compatibility constraints con-
tinue to be satisfied. Conversely, panel (b) shows that when the condition in Theorem 1
is unfulfilled, it is impossible to construct a distribution fulfilling both Consistency and
IC. At vbi for instance, the mass actual consumers with valuations at least v
b
i for firm i’s
product (shaded red area) exceeds the total mass of consumers in Ω \ Ei assigned some
message of at least vbi (shaded blue area). As such, since H
∗
i has been constructed such
that all incentive compatibility constraints are tight, any ‘rightward’ shift of the distri-
bution to satisfy consistency must entail violating at least one incentive compatibility
constraint.
Proof of Theorem 1. We first show that if the condition in part (i) of Theorem 1 is
fulfilled, Ψ∗ 6= ∅. In view of Lemma 1, it is sufficient to show there exists a set of
matching functions fulfilling incentive compatibility and consistency. We show this can







for each i. By construction, this binds the incentive compatibility constraint every-
where when indifferences in effective valuations are settled in favour of firm i. However,
this matching might violate consistency. But since the condition in Theorem 1 obtains,
H∗(v̂i + δ) ≥
∑
Θ\Ei:vi≥v̂i f(v) and we can find an alternate set of matching functions
(G′i)
n
i=1 through a series of ‘leftward’ shifts such that
18We can write this explicitly as h∗i (v̂i) = (H
∗
i (v̂i + δ)−H∗i (v̂i))/δ.
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Figure 2: Illustration of Theorem 1
(a) (b)
(i) G′i(v̂i|v̄i) ≤ G∗i (v̂i|v̄i) for all v̄i ∈ Vk and all v̂i ∈ {v ∈ Vk : v ≤ v̄i}; and
(ii) H ′i(v̂i + δ) =
∑
Θ\Ei:vi≥v̂i f(v) for all v̂i ∈ Vk.
Since G∗i (x̂i|x̄i) binds the incentive compatibility constraint everywhere, (i) ensures they
remain satisfied for all effective types v̄i ∈ Vk since each potential deviation can only be
less profitable under G′i; (ii) implies for all v̂i ∈ Vk,
H ′i(v̂i + δ) :=
∑
v̄i∈Vk














′|v̄i) = f(v′). Intuitively, we can ‘spread’ the mass of
matched consumers over the remaining n − 1 dimensions until consistency is fulfilled.
Since we can always perform this procedure for all firms i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the condition in
Theorem 1 (i) is sufficient.
We now show that if the condition in part (ii) of Theorem 1 is fulfilled, Ψ∗ = ∅. Now






i for each i. By construction, this binds the
incentive compatibility constraint everywhere when indifferences in effective valuations
are broken in favour of firm j 6= i. By hypothesis, there exists some firm i ∈ N and some






















hence there must exist some v′ such that∑
v̄i∈Vk
g(v′|v̄i) < f(v′)
thereby violating consistency. We therefore require an alternate function Gi
′ such that
Gi
′(v̂i|v̄i) ≥ Gi∗(v̂i|v̄i) with strict inequality for some v̄i, v̂i. But recall Gi∗ = G∗i hence the
incentive compatibility constraint is tight everywhere. Under Gi
′, there will then exist
some v̄i, v̂i for which it is broken, thereby violating condition IC. It is thus impossible
to simultaneously satisfy consistency and IC so by Lemma 1 (ii), we conclude Ψ∗ = ∅.
Finally, part (iii) of Theorem 1 follows because the distribution of types over Θ is atom-
less.
3.1 Comparative Statics. To avoid introducing addition notation, we state our com-
parative statistics in the limit case where δ → 0 though these results apply more generally.
Proposition 1. Consider two distributions f̃ and f such that







f̃(v′) for all v̂i ∈ Vk,







f̃(v′) for all v̂i ∈ Vk,
then as δ → 0, Ψ∗ 6= ∅ under f implies Ψ∗ 6= ∅ under f̃ .
The proof of Proposition 1 is deferred to Appendix A. Proposition 1 states that as
preferences become more polarised, i.e. consumers who originally preferred firm i’s now
prefer it more, while consumers who originally preferred j’s product now prefer i’s prod-
uct less, it becomes easier for the information designer to access information structures
which extract all potential surplus from consumers. A straightforward means to polarise
preferences might be through product differentiation or advertising e.g. Johnson and
Myatt (2006). Proposition 1 suggests advertising and related mechanisms to influence
preferences might be complementary with information design.19
Proposition 2. Suppose the information designer can also restrict firm i’s access to
some consumers. Denote ri : V
n
k → [0, 1] where ri(v′) ∈ [0, 1] is the mass of consumers










then as δ → 0, Ψ∗ 6= ∅ under (ri)ni=1 implies Ψ∗ 6= ∅ under (r̃i)ni=1.
19More generally, when both firms and consumers have incomplete information about valuations, the
information designer might find it optimal to design information for consumers in a way which polarises
preferences in expectation e.g. via the design of product rating systems. This might suggest that internet
companies’ ability to design information for both firms and consumers might be complementary, and
presents a fruitful avenue for future work.
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Proof of Proposition 2. If firm i cannot access consumers distributed according to ri,the






Proposition 2 is intuitive, and states that if the information designer can, in addition to
designing information, additionally restrict each firm’s access to some consumers, this
also weakens the conditions under which perfect segmentation and monopolization for
other non-restricted consumers is possible. For instance, if internet companies are able to
restrict the product offerings viewed by certain consumers, this not only directly restricts
price competition among firms, but also has the indirect effect of making segmentation
through information easier for other consumers to whom the internet company is unable
to restrict access.
4 Continuous Version of General Design in Hotelling Setting
The general model stated in Section 2 was discretized to aid exposition. However, we
develop a continuous counterpart of the discrete in Appendix B. This continuous model
works directly with mass 1−
∑
i ηi of consumers distributed over the underlying type space
Θ = [0, 1]n, and mass ηi ≥ 0 of captive consumers of type (v1 = 0, . . . , vi = 1, . . . , vn = 0)
for each i ∈ N . The continuous version of Theorem 1 can thus be stated as
Theorem 1c (Continuous analogue of Theorem 1). Ψ∗ 6= ∅ if and only if for all





We develop the model formally and prove this in Appendix B but point out the similar-
ities to Theorem 1 here. Hc∗i (v̂i) is the continuous analogue of H
∗
i (v̂i) and denotes the
maximum mass of consumers over Θ\Ei which can be matched to consumers in Ei—and
hence garbled together—while, at the same time, ensuring almost all incentive compat-
ibility constraints remains fulfilled. As before, this is done by constructing a function
analogous to G∗i which binds almost all incentive comparability constraints associated
with the message v̄i ∈ [0, 1] and then integrating this function over v̄i. The continuous
model generates the same key insights as the discrete case, but will additionally allow us
to map these conditions directly onto canonical models of product differentiation which
are typically set on continuous type spaces.
4.1 Mapping to Hotelling. We now map our general model into the Hotelling setting
introduced in the introduction with 2 firms and perfectly anti-correlated transportation
costs. The type space is now [0, 1] and a consumer of type x ∈ [0, 1] obtains utility
1 − tx (1 − t(1 − x) resp.) purchasing from firm 1 (2 resp.). Each firm has a mass
η ∈ [0, 1/2] of captive consumers, and the remaining mass of 1 − 2η consumers are
distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. As such, E1 = [0, 1/2] and E2 = [1/2, 1]. In addition,
define N1 := [1/2,min{1, 1/t}], the consumer types firm 1 cannot sell to in an efficient
allocation, but for which there are nonetheless gains from trade. Analogously, N2 :=
[max{0, 1−1/t}, 1/2].20 Finally, given t, let η̄G(t) be the threshold function denoting the
20In the general model, we associated the type space directly with valuations, so Ni = Θ \ Ei.
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minimum mass of captive consumers for each firm such that the condition in Theorem
1c is fulfilled.











Figure 3 below plots the threshold functions under simple (η̄S) and general (η̄G) designs.
The full analysis is deferred to Supplementary Appendix II.
Figure 3: Threshold functions for simple vs optimal information design
Note the marked decrease in the requisite mass of captive consumers given transport costs
t. In particular, for the canonical benchmark t = 1, while the simple design detailed in
the introduction required 7.5% of captive consumers, the general design does not require
any captive consumers. This is because the general design fully utilises all—and not just
captive—consumers of types Ei to hold down firm 1’s incentive to steal consumers of
types N1.
4.2 Lower bound on extractable surplus. We continue to work in the Hotelling
setting and suppose the condition in Theorem 1c is not fulfilled i.e. for a given (t, η)
pair, η < ηG(t). Consider the alternate design under which consumers of types [1/2 −
γ, 1/2 + γ] are bundled together. Both firms then compete a la Hotelling by setting a
uniform price for these types. We then perform our matching as before, but exclude
types [1/2 − γ, 1/2 + γ]. An illustration of this alternate scheme is shown in Figure 4
(a) which shows how each type x̄ ∈ E1 ∩ [0, 1/2 − γ] = [0, 1/2 − γ] is matched to a
distribution over N1 ∩ [1/2 + γ, 1] = [1/2 + γ,min{1, 1/t}]. For a given pair (t, η), we
can then find some threshold γ̄(t) such that for all γ > γ̄(t), there exists a set of message
functions which induces a subgame fulfilling efficiency and full surplus extraction for
all types [0, 1/2 − γ] ∪ [1/2 + γ, 1]. For this threshold γ̄(t), we can then find the total
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Figure 4: Alternate design and lower bound on total firm surplus
(a) Alternate Design (b) Total Firm Surplus
extractable surplus from non-captive consumers which we denote with FS(γ̄(t)). The
full analysis deferred to Supplementary Appendix III.
Figure 4 (b) compares the proportion of total surplus which can be extracted from non-
captive consumers under the alternate scheme against no-information (Hotelling), and
perfect-information benchmarks. For low masses of captive consumers, the alternate
design utilizes captive consumers to great effect and extracts substantially more surplus.
5 Conclusion
We have characterised a necessary and sufficient condition under which perfect segmen-
tation and monopolization can be achieved. These conditions are relatively weak, and
weaken further as consumer preferences become more polarised, or the designer can ad-
ditionally restrict firms’ access to consumers. When this condition is not fulfilled, we
showed that an intuitive alternative can still allow firms to extract significantly more
surplus than in a canonical Hotelling setting. These results suggest that absent regula-
tory oversight, segmentation and monopolization is something which could realistically
happen—and might be happening—across very many markets.
Although the general information design which works in the widest possible range of
settings can be complex relative to the simple design, implementation in both cases is
equally straightforward and simply requires all firms to obey pricing recommendations.
Further, conditional on all firms’ participation in such a scheme, in the resultant equilib-
rium, no (possibly singleton) subset of firms, taking the obedience of other firms as given,
can deviate to the benefit of all members. In this regard, firms can sidestep characteristic
impediments to collusion e.g. issues of monitoring and enforcement. This suggests an
additional object of regulatory concern.
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Appendices
A Omitted Proofs from Discrete Model
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (i): We first show that consistency and IC are sufficient to
induce an equilibrium fulfilling C1 and C2. By construction, every firm i ∈ N receives
precise information about the identities of consumers which value their product most.
If gi fulfils incentive compatibility, then conditional on receiving this information, firm
i prefers to follow the pricing recommendation rather than deviating to a lower price
to capture a larger slice of consumers (which includes those firm i should not sell to in
equilibrium). But by our consistency requirement, we have
∑
v̄i∈Vk g(v
′|v̄i) = f(v′) which
implies that after obeying pricing recommendations for each message realisation v̄i ∈ Vk,
all consumers of type v′ ∈ Θ \ Ei have been successfully garbled together with those in
Ei. As such, firm i cannot undercut its competitors to capture these consumers without
also hurting its profit margins on those of types Ei—which, by incentive compatibility,
is unprofitable. Finally, since this obtains for all firms, we have Ψ∗ 6= ∅.
Part (ii): Recall we assumed Vk ⊆M , and every firm learns about the effective valuation
v̄i for each consumer in Ei. This is without loss of generality since C1 and C2 require
firm i to sell to all consumers of type Ei and extract all possible surplus. This implies
for any v,v′ ∈ Ei such that v̄i 6= v̄′i, firm i must set different prices. As such, we need
ψ(m = φ(v̄i)|v(θ)) = 1 where φ performs a unique transformation of the preimage. It
is then without loss to choose φ(v̄i) = v̄i with the natural interpretation of messages as
price recommendations. It will thus suffice to show that both IC and consistency are
necessary.
First, IC. Recall this is the incentive compatibility condition under the assumption that
all indifferences in effective valuations are broken in favour of firm j 6= i. In particular,
Gi(v̂i|v̄i) represents a lower bound on the minimum extra mass of consumers firm i
captures from deviating to any price v̂i < v̄i, no matter the underlying distribution of
consumers within each price grid. As such, if IC is not fulfilled for all firms, all prices
recommendations, and all price deviations, then there must exist some firm i ∈ N , some
recommendation v̄i, and some deviation v̂i such that firm i can do better by charging
price v̂i < v̄i which successfully captures some positive mass of consumers of types Θ\Ei,
which violates both C1 and C2.
Finally, consistency. If M = Vk, consistency is trivially fulfilled since every consumer, by
definition, must be assigned a message realisation. We thus direct our attention to richer




′|v̄i) ≤ f(v′). Now suppose the inequality is strict for some firm i ∈ N




which represents the types which firm i should not sell to, but which have not been
matched to any consumer in Ei via gi (and hence assigned message realisation in M \Vk).
Now consider the following deviation by firm i to charge all such consumers with message
realisations M \ Vk price min{v′i : v′ ∈ S}. Under this deviation, since consumers are
distributed with full support over Θ, some positive measure set of consumers find it
profitable to buy from firm i instead at a strictly positive price. As such, this represents
a strictly profitable deviation which violates both C1 and C2.
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so by Theorem 1 (i), parts (i) and (ii) imply Ψ∗ 6= ∅ under f̃ .
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B Continuous Model
In this Appendix, we develop a continuous counterpart to the discrete model introduced
in Section 2.
B.1 Setup. There are n < ∞ firms indexed with the set N = {1, . . . , n}, and a
continuum of consumers with unit mass distributed over the type space where θ =
(v1, v2, . . . , vn) is a typical member of Θ. Each consumer demands a single unit inelas-
tically, so a consumer of type θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ Θ has value θi ∈ [0, 1] from purchasing
good i. Each firm i has mass ηi ≥ 0 of captive consumers of type Ci := (θ1 = 0, . . . , θi =
1, . . . , θn = 0). These consumers obtain the maximum value of 1 from buying from firm i,
and no utility from buying from firms j 6= i. The remaining mass 1−
∑
ηi of non-captive
consumers are distributed with bounded density f c(θ) with full support over Θ. We will
use the Dirac delta function δ(m− t) where
∫ t+ε
t−ε δ(m− t) = 1 for all ε > 0 to represent
atoms with positive mass at t.
Partition the hypercube Θ = [0, 1]n into n regions where Ei := {θ ∈ Θ : max(θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) =
θi} are the types of consumers (including captive consumers) who value firm i’s product
most, and so should purchase from firm i in an efficient allocation. Note Θ =
⋃n
i=1 Ei,
and Ei ∩ Ej is of measure zero for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
There is also an information designer and as before, we assume
Assumption 1. The information designer’s payoff is increasing in total firm surplus.
For each firm, the information designer commits in advance to a signal structure it will
provide about each type of consumer. For each firm i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the information
designer chooses a message function
ψci : Θ→ ∆(M c)
where M c ⊇ [0, 1] is the message space and ∆(M) is the set of feasible probability
distributions over M . Call m ∈ M a message realisation. Denote the set of all sets
of message functions with Ψ. The information designer then learns the exact valuation
of each consumer for each product and releases messages to each firm i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
accordance to the signal structure. Given the messages for each consumer, firms then
play a pricing game: a pricing function for firm i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is pci : M c → R+. Let P ci be
the space of possible pricing functions for firm i. A strategy for firm i is σci : M
c → ∆(P ci ).




Our goal is, as before, to characterize conditions under there exists ψc such that in
Γc(ψc), all all consumers of type θ ∈ Θ,
C1 (Efficient allocation) buys from firm i if and only if θ ∈ Ei; and
C2 (Full Surplus Extraction) pays maxvi v(θ).
B.2 Characterisation. Let Γc∗ denote the set of induced games in which there exists
an equilibrium satisfying conditions C1 and C2, and let
Ψc∗ := {ψc : Γc(ψc) ∈ Γc∗}
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be the set of message functions that the information designer can use to fulfil both
conditions. We now turn our attention towards characterising exact conditions under
which an information designer is able to achieve conditions C1 and C2 i.e. Ψc∗ 6= ∅.
Define the matching gci : {θi : θ ∈ Ei} → ∆(Θ \ Ei) which matches all consumers with
types in Ei of with valuation θi for firm i’s product to a distribution over the types
Θ \ Ei. Matched consumers are assigned identical messages. Now assume types θ ∈ Ei
are allocated message m = θi with probability 1. We subsequently show this is without
loss of generality. Observe that the density of consumers at θ′ ∈ Θ \ Ei matched to
θ̄i ∈ {θi : θ ∈ Ei} (and hence assigned message θ̄i) must be equivalent to the density of
consumers which are assigned message θ̄i given the underlying type θ
′ ∈ Θ \Ei scaled by
the actual density of consumers at θ′. This can be succinctly written as
gci (θ
′|θ̄i) = ψi(m = θ̄i|θ′)f c(θ′) for all θ̄i ∈ {θi : θ ∈ Ei}, θ′ ∈ Θ \ Ei.
For non-captive consumers of types Ei \Ci, we can now represent firm i’s demand given
the message realisation m, matching functions gc, and price pi with
Di(pi = θ̂i|gc,m = θ̄i) =
Demand from the set Ei \ Ci.︷ ︸︸ ︷∫
Ei\Ci








ψci (m = θ̄i)
,
where 1 > θ̄i ≥ θ̂i. For captive consumers of type Ci, we can analogously represent firm
i’s conditional demand with






ψci (m = 1)
,
where 1 = θ̄i ≥ θ̂i, noting that ψi(m = 1) is of positive mass if and only if it has positive
mass of captive consumers, i.e. ψci (m = 1) = ηiδ(m − 1). We now state an analogue of
Lemma 1 which shows that it is without loss of generality to look for message functions
of a particular kind.
Lemma 1c. Ψ∗ 6= ∅ if and only if there exists ψ ∈ Ψ such that
(i) (Price recommendation) For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all θ̄ ∈ Ei, ψci (m = θ̄i|θ̄) =
δ(m− (1− θ̄i)) i.e. firm i receives message m = θ̄i with probability 1.
(ii) There exists a set of matching functions gc such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(a) (Incentive Compatibility) for almost all θ̄i ∈ [0, 1]
θ̄iDi(pi = θ̄i|gc,m = θ̄i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus from setting price θ̄i.
≥ θ̂iDi(pi = θ̂i|gc,m = θ̄i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus from setting price θ̂i.
for all θ̂i ≤ θ̄i;
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(b) (Consistency) for almost all θ′ ∈ Θ \ Ei,∫
[0,)
gci (θ
′|θ̄i)dθ̄i + gci (θ′|1) = f c(x′).
We prove Lemma 1c at the end of this Appendix. By Lemma 1c, is without loss of
generality to look for messages satisfying conditions (i) and (ii)(a)-(b). Condition (i)
states that each firm i should receive precise and accurate information about preferences
for i’s product for all consumers it should serve in an efficient allocation. This makes
full surplus extraction feasible. Condition (ii)(a) requires that conditional on receiving
message m = θ̄i, firm i prefers to extract all surplus from types {θ ∈ Ei : θi = x̄i} by
following the pricing recommendation rather than lowering its price to θ̂i and obtaining
additional demand from consumers outside the set Ei. Condition (ii)(b) requires the set
of matching functions to be consistent with the distribution of consumer types.
We now turn to the question of whether such message functions can be constructed.
Consider firm i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and choose a set of message functions—and hence matching














f c(θ′i = θ̄i,θ
′
−i)d
n−1θ′−i if θ̂i < θ̄i < 1 ,
0 if θ̂i ≥ θ̄i,
noting that this object is always of zero mass.22 For captive consumers, define





noting that this can be of positive mass since there can be an atom of captive consumers
at Ci. It will also be helpful to develop notation for the total mass of consumers in the
set Θ \ Ei which (i) have value greater than θ̂i from purchasing from firm i; and (ii) are




Gc∗i (θ̂i|θ̄i)dθ̄i︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-captive
consumers
+Gc∗i (θ̂i|θ̄i = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
captive
consumers
noting that Hc∗i (x̂i) is decreasing and of positive mass. We are now ready to state the
continuous counterpart to Theorem 1.





21Note that we can do this because we are not yet imposing consistency.
22To see this, note that
∫
Ei
f c(θ′i = θ̄i,θ
′
−i)d
n−1θ′−i is the mass of a n − 1 dimensional hyperplane
over Ei.
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The key ideas underlying Theorem 1c are similar to that of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1c. If: Suppose the condition in Theorem 1c is fulfilled. In view of
Lemma 1c, it is sufficient to show that there exists a set of matching functions fulfilling
conditions (i) and (ii)(a)-(c). We show that these matching functions can always be con-
structed by first considering Gc∗(θ̂i|θ̄i). By construction, this just satisfies the incentive
compatibility constraints of condition (ii)(a). However, it might violate the consistency
condition (ii)(b). But since the condition in Theorem 1c obtains, we can find an alternate
function G̃c(x̂i|x̄i) such that




G̃c(θ̂i|θ̄i)dxi + G̃c(θ̂i|θ̄i = 1) =
∫
Θ\Ei:θ′i≥θ̂i
f c(θ′)dnθ′ for all θ̂i ∈ [0, 1].
Since Gc∗(θ̂i|θ̄i) binds the incentive compatibility constraint everywhere, (i) ensures they
remain satisfied for almost all types in the interval [0, 1]. (ii) implies we can always find a





′|θ̄i)dθ̄i + g̃ci (θ′|θ̄i = 1) such that
h̃ci(θ
′) = f c(θ′) for almost all θ′ ∈ Θ \ Ei, hence fulfilling the consistency condition of
Lemma 1c. Since we can always perform this procedure for all firms i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the
condition in Theorem 1c is sufficient.
Only if: Again, consider Gc∗(θ̂i|θ̄i) and corresponding function Hc∗i (θ̂i). Noting that H∗i





c(θ′)dnθ′). This is the value at
which our cumulative function Hc∗i is equal to the total mass of consumers distributed
over Θ \Ei. The condition in Theorem 1c trivially fulfilled for θ̂i ∈ [0, αi] so it is without
loss to consider θ̂i ∈ [αi, 1]. Now suppose, towards a contradiction, that Ψc∗ 6= ∅ but





There then exists a positive mass set of consumers of types S ⊂ {θ ∈ Θ \ Ei : θ ≥ θ̂i}
which will not be assigned some message m ∈ [0, 1] hence violating condition (ii)(b) of
Lemma 1c. Intuitively, if this obtains, firm i can profitably deviate by stealing some
positive mass of consumers in this set from firms j 6= i thereby violating C1 and C2.
As such, we require an alternate function G
∼ c
i(θ̂i|θ̄i) such that G
∼ c
i(θ̂i|θ̄i) ≥ Gc∗i (θ̂i|θ̄i) with
strict inequality over some positive measure set. This corresponds to ‘rightward’ shifts
of the matching distribution. But then recall Gc∗i (θ̂i|θ̄i) was constructed such that firm i
is just indifferent between obeying the pricing recommendation and deviating by setting
price θ̂i ≤ θ̄i. As such, fulfilling consistency requires violating incentive constraints for
some positive measure set. It is thus impossible to simultaneously satisfy conditions
(ii)(a) and (ii)(c) of Lemma 1c, a contradiction which then implies Ψc∗ = ∅.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 1c. The proof of Lemma 1c proceeds similarly to that of Lemma
1 though we state it here for completeness.
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Proof. If: By construction, conditions (i), (ii)(a)-(b) are sufficient to induce an equi-
librium in the resultant subgame fulfilling conditions C1 and C2. We now show it is
without loss of generality to consider messages of this form. Only if: We wish to show
if there is no set of message functions fulfilling conditions (i), (ii)(a)-(b), then Ψc∗ = ∅.
To see part (i) is necessary, recall Ψc∗ is the set of all sets of message functions which
can induce an equilibrium fulfilling conditions C1 and C2 in the induced subgame. C1
and C2 require firm i to sell to all consumers of type Ei and extract all possible surplus.
As such, messages for such types must be sufficiently precise such that for any θ̄ ∈ Ei,
ψc(m = φc(θ̄i)|θ̄) = δ(m − φci(θ̄i)) where φc performs a unique transformation of the
pre-image. This also implies for any θ̄, θ̄′ ∈ Ei such that θ̄i 6= θ̄′i, firm i must set different
prices. It is therefore without loss of generality to choose φc(θ̄i) = θ̄i.
We now consider condition (ii)(b). If M = {θi : θ ∈ Ei} = [0, 1], it is trivially fulfilled.
We thus direct our attention to richer message spaces with M ⊃ [0, 1]. Since every
consumer must be assigned some message, consumers of type θ assigned messages in
the interval [0, 1] must be weakly less than the actual density of actual consumers, i.e.∫
θ̄i:Ei\Ci g
c
i (θ|θ̄i)dθ̄i + gci (x|θ̄i = 1) ≤ f c(θ). As such, to show that condition (ii)(b) is
necessary, it will suffice to show that if Ψc∗ 6= ∅ and condition (i) obtains, then the set
S :=
{
θ ∈ Θ \ Ei :
∫
[0,1)
gci (θ|θ̄i)dx̄i + gci (θ|θ̄i = 1) < f c(θ)
}
is zero measure for all firms i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
To see this, suppose, towards a contradiction, that the set S is not zero measure for
some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} i.e. some consumers with types in the set S are not matched to any
consumers in Ei (and so assigned some message M \ [0, 1]). Then consider the following
deviation by firm i to charge all consumers in S some price p ∈ (0, sup{θi : θ ∈ S}).
This is strictly profitable because it successfully obtains a positive mass of additional
consumers. To see this, recall ψc ∈ Ψc∗ implies conditions C1 and C2 are fulfilled, so
all firms j 6= i extract the full surplus from all consumers in the set Ej. This in turn
implies all consumers in the set Θ \Ei obtain zero surplus in equilibrium whereas under
the proposed deviation, consumers in some positive mass subset of consumers of types
S ⊆ Θ \Ei obtain strictly positive surplus. As such, if condition (ii)(b) is violated, then
Ψc∗ = ∅.
Finally, suppose condition (ii)(a) is violated. There will then exist some firm i and some
positive measure set T ⊆ [0, 1] such that for all message realisations t ∈ T , firm i finds it
strictly profitable to deviate from the pricing recommnedation and sell to consumers in
the set Θ \Ei at a price strictly lower than their valuation. This then violates conditions
C1 and C2. As such, if condition (ii)(a) is violated, then Ψc∗ = ∅. Hence, it is without
loss of generality to consider messages satisfying conditions (i) and (ii)(a)-(ii)(b).
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